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Stochastic dominance is a term which refers to a set of relations that may hold between
a pair of distributions. A very common application of stochastic dominance is to the
analysis of income distributions and income inequality, the main focus in this article.
The concept can, however, be applied in many other domains, in particular ﬁnancial
economics, where the distributions considered are usually those of the random returns
to various ﬁnancial assets. In what follows, there are often clear analogies between
things expressed in terms of income distributions and ﬁnancial counterparts.
2. Deﬁnition of stochastic dominance
In order to determine whether a relation of stochastic dominance holds between two
distributions, the distributions are ﬁrst characterized by their cumulative distribution
functions, or CDFs. For a given set of incomes, the value of the CDF at income y is
the proportion of incomes in the set that are no greater than y. In the context of a
random variable Y , the value of the CDF of the distribution of Y at y is the probability
that Y should be no greater than y.
Suppose that we consider two distributions A and B, characterized respectively by
CDFs FA and FB. Then distribution B dominates distribution A stochastically at
ﬁrst order if, for any argument y, FA(y) ≥ FB(y). This deﬁnition often looks as
though it is the wrong way round, but a moment’s reﬂection shows that it is correct
as stated. If y denotes an income level, then the inequality in the deﬁnition means
that the proportion of individuals in distribution A with incomes no greater than y is
no smaller than the proportion of such individuals in B. In other words, there is at
least as high a proportion of poor people in A as in B, if poverty means an income
smaller than y. If B dominates A at ﬁrst order, then whatever poverty line we may
choose, there is always more poverty in A than in B, which is why we say that A is
the dominated distribution.
Higher orders of stochastic dominance can also be deﬁned. To this end, we deﬁne
repeated integrals of the CDF of each distribution. Formally, we deﬁne a sequence of
functions by the recursive deﬁnition
D1(y) = F(y), Ds+1(y) =
Z y
0
Ds(z)dz, for s = 1,2,3.....
Thus the function D1 is the CDF of the distribution under study, D2(y) is the integral
of D1 from 0 to y, D3(y) is the integral of D2 from 0 to y, and so on. By deﬁnition,
distribution B dominates A at order s if Ds
A(y) ≥ Ds
B(y) for all arguments y. The
lower limit of 0 is used for clarity of exposition; in general it is the lowest income
in the pooled distributions. The deﬁnition makes it clear that ﬁrst-order dominance
implies dominance at all higher orders, and more generally that dominance at order s
implies dominance at all orders higher than s. Since the implications go in only one
– 1 –direction, it follows that higher-order dominance is a weaker condition than lower-
order dominance. I will give a more detailed interpretation of the functions Ds shortly
in the context of poverty indices.
In theoretical arguments, it is sometimes desirable to distinguish weak from strong
stochastic dominance. The above deﬁnitions are of weak dominance. For strong dom-
inance, it is required that the inequality should be strict for at least one value of
the argument y. In empirical investigations, the distinction is of no interest, since no
statistical test can detect a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between weak and strong inequalities.
Some applications make use of the concept of restricted stochastic dominance. This
means that the relevant inequality is required to hold over some restricted range of
the argument y rather than for all possible values. In empirical work, it is often only
restricted dominance that can usefully be studied, since with continuous distributions
there are usually too few data in the tails of the distributions for statistically signiﬁcant
conclusions to be drawn. Again, for measures of poverty, it is only dominance over the
range of incomes up to the poverty line that is of interest.
3. Relation between stochastic dominance and welfare
When studying either income inequality or poverty, one is automatically in a normative
context. Most modern studies make explicit or implicit use of a social welfare function
or SWF. In a paper by Blackorby and Donaldson (1980) (henceforth BD), various
ethically desirable criteria are developed and the sorts of SWF that respect these
criteria are characterized.
One of these criteria is the anonymity of individuals. If we take all the worldly goods
of a rich man and give them to a poor man, and then give the few worldly goods of
the poor man to the rich, then social welfare should be unchanged. Formally, a SWF
that respects this requirement is symmetric with respect to its arguments, which are
the incomes of the members of society.
Another requirement is the Pareto principle. According to it, we should rank situa-
tion B better than situation A if at least one individual is better oﬀ in B than in A,
and no one is worse oﬀ. In order for a SWF to respect the Pareto principle, it must
be increasing in all its arguments.
Another requirement, for measures of poverty only, is that a poverty index should not
depend at all on the incomes of the nonpoor. BD show that this implies a separability
condition on the SWF. If in addition we require that the poverty index should be de-
ﬁned for arbitrary poverty lines, then the separability condition becomes a requirement





where the “utility” function u is increasing in its argument. Alternatively, the SWF
can be any increasing transform of the function W. In all cases, the SWF is symmetric
and increasing in its arguments, and so satisﬁes BD’s ethical criteria.
– 2 –It can be seen that ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance of A by B means that B has higher
social welfare than A for all SWFs of the form (1). This can be shown by a simple
integration by parts, under the assumption that the function u is diﬀerentiable. In
fact, this dominance is also a necessary condition for B to have higher welfare than A
for all SWFs of the form (1).
It follows from the above argument that, if we use ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
as a criterion for ranking distributions, then we need not restrict attention to a spe-
ciﬁc SWF, since any SWF of the form (1) gives the same ranking if one distribution
dominates the other at ﬁrst order.
A more restricted class of SWFs is given by functions of the form (1) where we impose
the additional restriction that the second derivative of u is negative. It turns out that
all the SWFs of this more restricted class give a unanimous ranking of two distributions
if one dominates the other at second order. This sort of result can be extended to higher
orders of dominance. As the dominance condition becomes progressively weaker, the
class of SWFs that give unanimous rankings becomes progressively smaller, subject to
more and more restrictive conditions on the function u and its derivatives.
4. Relation between stochastic dominance and poverty
The so-called headcount ratio is sometimes used as a measure of the amount of poverty
in a given income distribution. This ratio is the proportion of individuals in the distri-
bution with incomes below (or equal to) the poverty line. If this line is denoted by z,
then the headcount ratio is the value of the CDF at z. If we have two populations,
A and B, characterized by two CDFs, FA and FB, then, for poverty line z, the head-
count ratio is higher in A than in B if and only if FA(z) > FB(z). If the inequality
FA(y) > FB(y) holds for all values of y up to z, then we have restricted ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance up to z.
Corresponding to any income y less than z, we deﬁne the poverty gap as z −y. When
we restrict attention to the welfare of people with incomes less than z, it is convenient
to use a function π that measures the disutility of the poverty gap, rather than a






If π0 > 0, which means that the disutility of poverty increases with the poverty gap,
it can be shown that, for all poverty indices of the above form, there is more poverty
in A than in B if B dominates A at ﬁrst order over the range of incomes less than or
equal to z.
Earlier, a sequence of functions Ds was introduced, these functions being repeated







(z − y)s−1 dF(y). (2)
– 3 –The formula clearly holds for s = 1, if we remember that 0! = 1. It is not hard to
show by induction that it also holds for integers greater than 1.





from which we see that, for given z, D2(z) is the average poverty gap for poverty line z.
If, for all z ∈ [z−,z+], D2
A(z) > D2
B(z), then it follows that the average poverty gap is
greater in A than in B for all poverty lines in the interval [z−,z+]. But this condition
is just restricted second-order stochastic dominance of A by B over that interval.
As with welfare functions, this result can be extended. By progressively restricting the
admissible class of poverty indices, in particular by imposing signs on the derivatives
of π, it can be seen that all poverty indices in these more restricted classes unanimously
see more poverty in A than in B if there is a progressively higher order of stochastic
dominance; see Davidson and Duclos (2000) for more details.
An essential reference on poverty measurement is Atkinson (1987), in which the ax-
iomatic approach of BD is extended to poverty measurement. See also three papers
by Foster and Shorrocks (1988a, b, and c).
5. Relation between stochastic dominance and inequality
If a richer person in distribution A transfers some income to a poorer person in such
a way that the richer person stays richer after the transfer, the post-transfer distri-
bution B stochastically dominates A at second order. The Pigou-Dalton principle of
transfers says that “Robin-Hood” transfers of the sort described should improve wel-
fare. But it is easy to see that distribution B does not dominate A at ﬁrst order,
and indeed this is right and proper according to the Pareto principle, since the richer
person is worse oﬀ after the transfer.
This example shows that, when we discuss inequality, we are not talking about the
same thing as welfare. Any reasonable measure of inequality must declare that there
is no inequality if everyone has the same income, even if everyone is in abject poverty.
The classical tool for studying inequality is the Lorenz curve. For any proportion p
between zero and one, the ordinate of the corresponding point on the Lorenz curve
for a given income distribution is the proportion of total income that accrues to the
ﬁrst 100p per cent of people when they are sorted in order of increasing income. By
construction, the Lorenz curve ﬁts into the unit square, lies below the 45-degree line
that is the diagonal of that square, and is (weakly) convex. Figure 1 displays a typical
Lorenz curve.
A distribution B is said to Lorenz dominate another distribution A if the Lorenz
curve of B lies everywhere above that of A. We then say that there is less inequality
in B than in A. But this comparison of A and B is not a welfare comparison, and,
in particular, does not allow a comparison of poverty. This defect is remedied by
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Figure 1. A Typical Lorenz Curve
the concept of generalized Lorenz dominance, based on the generalized Lorenz curve
introduced by Shorrocks (1983). The ordinates of this curve are the Lorenz ordinates
multiplied by the average income of the distribution. It turns out that generalized
Lorenz dominance is the same thing as second-order stochastic dominance. Either one
of these concepts implicitly mixes notions of welfare and inequality, as shown by the
fact that the function u in a SWF of form (1) that respects second-order dominance
has a negative second derivative, which implies diminishing marginal (social) utility
of income. The discussion of the previous section shows that higher-order dominance
criteria put more and more weight on the welfare of the poorest members of society.
Graphical representation and quantiles
Consider the setup in Figure 2, where the CDFs of two distributions A and B are plot-
ted. The functions D2 used for second-order dominance comparisons can be evaluated
for a given argument, like z1 in the ﬁgure, as the areas beneath the CDFs, by the usual
geometric interpretation of the Riemann integral. We see that distribution B domi-
nates A at second order because, although the CDFs cross, the areas between them
are such that the condition for second-order dominance is always satisﬁed. Thus the
vertical line MN marks oﬀ a large positive area between the graphs of the two CDFs
up to the point at which they cross, and thereafter a small negative area bounded on
the right by MN.
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Figure 2. Generalized Lorenz and Second Order Dominance
For generalized Lorenz dominance, it can be shown that what must be non-negative
everywhere is the area between the two curves, bounded not by a vertical line like MN,
but rather by a horizontal line like KL. This area is the diﬀerence between the ar-
eas under two quantile functions, a quantile function being by deﬁnition the inverse
of the CDF. Although it is tedious to demonstrate it algebraically, it is intuitively
clear that if the areas bounded on the right by vertical lines like MN are always pos-
itive, then so are the areas bounded above by horizontal lines like KL. This is why
generalized Lorenz dominance and second-order stochastic dominance are equivalent
conditions. The whole theory of stochastic dominance can be developed using quan-
tiles rather than incomes; this is called a p-approach. Such approaches are used to
advantage in Jenkins and Lambert (1997, 1998), Shorrocks (1998), and also Spencer
and Fisher (1992).
Another thing that emerges clearly from Figure 2 is that the threshold income z1 up
to which ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance holds is always smaller than the threshold z2
up to which we have second-order dominance. In the Figure, we have second-order
dominance everywhere, and so we can set z2 equal to the highest income in either
distribution. More generally, we can deﬁne a threshold zs as the greatest income up
to which we have dominance at order s. The zs constitute an increasing sequence.
A result shown in Davidson and Duclos (2000) is that, if the distribution B domi-
nates A at ﬁrst-order over a range [0,z], with z > 0, then, no matter what happens
– 6 –for incomes above z, there is always some order s such that B dominates A at order s
over the full range of the two distributions, provided only that that range is ﬁnite.
Estimation and Inference
Suppose that we have a random sample of N independent observations yi, i = 1,...,N,












(z − yi)s−1I(yi ≤ z), (3)
where ˆ F denotes the empirical distribution function of the sample and I(·) is an in-
dicator function equal to 1 when its argument is true and 0 otherwise. For s = 1,
the formula (3) estimates the population CDF by the empirical distribution function.
For arbitrary s, it has the convenient property of being a sum of independent and
identically distributed (IID) variables, which makes it easy to show that (3) is consis-
tent and asymptotically normal. The asymptotic variance is also easy to estimate in a
distribution-free manner, by which is meant that no parametric assumptions need be
made about the distributions under study.
When two distributions are compared for stochastic dominance, two kinds of situations
typically arise. The ﬁrst is when there are two independent populations, with random
samples from each. The other arises when we have independent paired drawings from
the same population. For instance, one variable could be before-tax income, and the
other after-tax income for the same individual. Explicit expressions for the asymptotic
variance of the diﬀerence between the estimates of Ds(z) for the case of independent
samples were given as early as 1989 in an unpublished thesis, Chow (1989). The sam-
pling distribution of a related estimator for poverty indices and independent samples
is found in Kakwani (1993), Bishop, Chow, and Zheng (1995) and Rongve (1997). For
a diﬀerent approach to inference on stochastic dominance, see Anderson (1996). A
comprehensive approach to inference on stochastic dominance is found in Davidson
and Duclos (2000).
The approach proposed by McFadden (1989) is based on the supremum of the diﬀerence
between the estimates (3) for two independent populations. For s = 1, this turns out
to be a variant of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, with known properties. For higher
values of s, although it is easy to compute the statistic, its asymptotic properties
under the null are not analytically tractable. However, simulation-based methods can
surmount this diﬃculty; see Barrett and Donald (2003).
A somewhat vexed question in testing for dominance is whether to test the null hy-
pothesis of dominance or that of non-dominance. The latter has the advantage that,
if the null is rejected, all that remains is dominance. More generally, the former ap-
proach rejects the null of dominance only when there is clear evidence against it, and
the latter accepts the alternative of dominance only when there is clear evidence in
its favour. The former approach is more common in the literature; see for instance
– 7 –Richmond (1982), Beach and Richmond (1985), Wolak (1989), and Bishop, Formby,
and Thistle (1992). The latter is discussed in an unpublished paper, Howes (1993),
and in Kaur, Prakasa-Rao, and Singh (1994).
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